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EMTALA & Psychiatric Patients 
Alexander M. Martell* 
 
I. Introduction 
Before the mid-twentieth century, hospitals primarily served the poor and helpless.1 
However, as technology progressed and business models in the United States changed, hospitals 
faced increasing costs to providing care.2  Reacting to this change, many hospitals altered their 
models so that only those who could afford care would receive care, until the passage of the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA).3  Congress 
specifically enacted EMTALA to prevent federally participating hospitals from this practice of 
“patient dumping.”4  EMTALA was created to protect the most vulnerable populations from 
being turned away from medical treatment.5 
EMTALA is overseen by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and requires 
reporting from the federally participating hospitals.6  Any false reports to CMS result in a fraud 
to the system; a failure to properly treat, screen, or transfer a patient is an abuse of the system.  In 
an effort to prevent these problems in hospital emergency departments (EDs), Congress imposed 
a penalty of up to a $50,000 for each EMTALA violation as well as the potential for a permanent 
ban from Medicare and Medicaid.7  However, statutory ambiguity has led to conflicting 
jurisprudence, reducing the government’s ability to consistently enforce EMTALA.  Some courts 
                                                 
*Alexander M. Martell is a 2019 graduate of DePaul University College of Law. 
1Alexa E. Welzien, Balancing EMTALA's Duty to Stabilize Hospital Inpatients and CMS's Regulations in the Midst 
of A Struggling Hospital Industry, 23 HEALTH LAW 21 (2011). 
2 Id. 
3 Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that EMTALA passed 
amid growing reports of denying emergency health care services to poor and uninsured individuals). 
4 42 U.S.C. §1395dd (2012). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. Permanent bans from Medicare and Medicaid mean that the hospital will no longer be eligible for 
reimbursement for services provided to a Medicare or Medicaid recipient. It would create a situation where only 
private insurance would be accepted at the hospital. A permanent ban from federal health programs can have 
devastating financial consequences for a hospital. 
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have set improper precedent by allowing the problems EMTALA was designed to prevent to 
occur without finding a violation.  This article will address how EMTALA has been misapplied 
by the courts and the resulting departure in enforcement from the initial congressional intent. 
This article urges an interpretation of EMTALA that is consistent with the original 
congressional intent: to protect the most vulnerable patients.  In furtherance of this claim, this 
article will examine the applicability of EMTALA to psychiatric patients, the difficulty in 
assessing those cases, and the few violations that have ended in settlements.  Additionally, this 
article will argue that it is necessary to adopt a new standard regarding EMTALA psychiatric 
cases.  The National Institute on Mental Health found, “there were an estimated 9.8 million 
adults aged 18 or older in the United States with SMI [severe mental illness] within the past 
year,” as of 2015.8  Since EMTALA passed in 1986, there have been eight reported settlements 
for violations involving psychiatric cases.9  Between 2002 and 2015, 192 cases were reported – 
only three settled.10  Since 2015, there have already been four reported EMTALA psychiatric 
settlements, one of which cost the hospital over one million dollars.11 
The growing number of psychiatric patients in the ED has been caused by several factors.  
One factor that is discussed by the Treatment Advocacy Center (Center), “a nonprofit 
organization dedicated to eliminating legal and other barriers to the timely and effective 
                                                 
8 Serious Mental Illness (SMI) Among U.S. Adults, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/serious-mental-illness-smi-among-us-adults.shtml (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2017). 
9 Nadia Zuabi, Larry D. Weiss & Mark I. Langdorf, Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) 2002-
15: Review of Office of Inspector General Patient Dumping Settlements Western Journal of Emergency Medicine 
(2016), NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4899053/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2017).; Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, Civil Monetary Penalties and 
Affirmative Exclusions Civil Monetary Penalties and Affirmative Exclusions, HHS, 
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/cmp-ae.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
10 Id. 
11 Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, Civil Monetary Penalties and Affirmative 
Exclusions Civil Monetary Penalties and Affirmative Exclusions, HHS, 
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/cmp-ae.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
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treatment of severe mental illness,” deals with the inefficiencies in EDs across the country.12  
According to the Center, “at least 70% of ER administrators held mentally ill patients for 24 
hours or longer waiting for a bed.”13  These numbers are troubling and are exemplified by the 
large settlements that have occurred in recent years.14  The other major factor that the Center 
discusses is the current lack of psychiatric beds in hospitals.15  One shocking statistic published 
by the Center cites the massive decline in psychiatric beds, stating “the number of state hospital 
beds in the United States had plummeted almost 97% by 2016.  Even when private hospitals are 
included, the number of psychiatric beds per 100,000 people in the United States ranks the nation 
29th in the number of psychiatric beds per 100,000 people since 1955.16  Psychiatric patients 
have been limited to EDs to seek treatment in recent years due to the shortages in adequate 
facilities.17  The use of EDs as primary care facilities for a growing number of psychiatric 
patients lends legitimacy and strength to the argument that hospitals should comply with the 
language of EMTALA as intended by the legislature. 
This article will consider the trend of settlements alongside the trend of statutory 
interpretation.  Violations of EMTALA constitute both fraud and abuse to the healthcare system. 
The recent increase of settlements suggests violations will continue.  To better address these 
issues, the courts should require a clear standard for interpreting EMTALA cases involving 
psychiatric patients.  This article argues that the best way to combat fraud and abuse affecting 
                                                 
12 Public Service Costs, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/key-
issues/public-service-costs (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
13 Id. 
14 See generally Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, Civil Monetary Penalties 
and Affirmative Exclusions Civil Monetary Penalties and Affirmative Exclusions, HHS, 
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/cmp-ae.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2017). 
15 Psychiatric Bed Shortages, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/key-
issues/bed-shortages (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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psychiatric patients is to adopt the reasoning applied by the Sixth Circuit.  The reasoning and 
rule developed by the Sixth Circuit will help to quickly resolve cases and provide the healthcare 
system with a clear standard for treatment.  Section II of this article conducts a plain language 
interpretation of the statute, as is required for courts to use when applying EMTALA.  Section III 
of the article looks at the statutory interpretation and legislative intent of EMTALA, the second 
stage of analysis for courts if the plain language of the statute is unclear.  Section IV considers 
the judicial interpretations of EMTALA and the recent settlements.  Section V covers the 
conclusion of the article, a demand that courts apply the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of 
EMTALA to protect all patients, most importantly psychiatric patients. 
II. Plain Language Interpretation Demands Stabilization to Satisfy the Act’s 
Requirements 
 
Subsection (b)(1) of EMTALA declares that when an individual arrives in the Emergency 
Department (ED) with an emergency medical condition, “the hospital must provide either-- 
within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, . . . treatment as may be required to 
stabilize the medical condition, or transfer of the individual to another medical facility in 
accordance with subsection (c) of this section.”1819  EMTALA generally limits the ability to 
transfer a patient unless that patient is deemed to be stabilized.20  Subsection (c) provides 
guidance for the limited circumstances in which an unstable patient may be transferred, as well 
as explains the situations in which appropriate transfer of the patient exists.21  EMTALA defines 
“stabilized” to mean “that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable 
                                                 
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
19 Determining what qualifies as being an emergency medical condition will be discussed further in the following 
section of statutory interpretation, but for the purpose of this section, psychiatric conditions are considered 
emergency medical conditions. 
20 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd. 
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(c). 
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medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility, 
or, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in paragraph (1)(B), that the 
woman has delivered (including the placenta).”22  Because of the difficulties of determining 
whether a “material deterioration” would occur with respect to psychiatric conditions, the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) clarified, “[p]sychiatric patients are 
considered stable when they are protected and prevented from injuring or harming him/herself or 
others.”23  With the definitions of stabilization established, we now turn to the appropriateness of 
transfers as explained by subsection (c). 
Subsection (c)(1) outlines the limited situation in which an unstable patient may be 
transferred.24  It should be noted that at no time does EMTALA allow for an unstable patient to 
be discharged.25  The subsection provides for three situations when an unstable patient may be 
transferred to another hospital: (1) when the patient or their representative requests in writing to 
transfer to another hospital “after being informed of the hospital's obligations;” (2) when a 
physician signs a certification that “treatment at another medical facility outweighs the increased 
risks to the individual. . . from effecting the transfer;” or (3) when a qualified medical person 
(not a physician) signs a certification that “treatment at another medical facility outweighs the 
increased risk to the individual . . . from effecting the transfer” based on a consultation with a 
physician.26  If any of the three conditions have been met, the appropriateness of the transfer 
must also be satisfied as enumerated in subsection (c)(2). 
                                                 
22 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(e). 
23 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare State Operations Manual, Appendix V Interpretive 
Guidelines – Responsibilities of Medicare Participating Hospitals in Emergency Cases, Revision 60, 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/som107ap_v_emerg.pdf, July 16, 
2010. 
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(c). 
25 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd. 
26 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(c)(1). 
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“An appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer in which the transferring hospital 
provides the medical treatment within its capacity which minimizes the risks to the individual's 
health and, in the case of a woman in labor, the health of the unborn child.”27  In addition to the 
basic requirements that the receiving hospital have greater capabilities to treat the affected 
patient, EMTALA requires that the receiving hospital “has available space and qualified 
personnel for the treatment of the individual, and has agreed to accept transfer of the individual 
and to provide appropriate medical treatment.”28  The text of the statute is clear: when a patient is 
unstable, they cannot be transferred unless certain criteria have been met, and it is never 
appropriate to discharge an unstable patient.29  However, the courts and CMS have started to 
ignore the plain language of the statute as well as the clearly illustrated statutory intent outlined 
in Section III.30 
In 2012, CMS released its proposed rules regarding EMTALA.31  First, CMS claimed, 
“EMTALA requirements do not extend to stabilized inpatients even if they subsequently become 
unstable because those inpatients are protected by a number of Medicare conditions of 
participation (CoPs) as well as the hospital’s other legal, licensing, and professional obligations 
with respect to . . . treatment of its patients.”32  Alleging that an individual has other potential 
remedies to harms committed against him or her does not exempt a hospital from the statutory 
                                                 
27 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(c)(2). 
28 Id. 
29 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). 
30 See Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 95 F.3d 349, 350-2 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Bryant v. 
Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1168-70 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a hospital’s obligations under 
EMTALA end at the time that a hospital admits an individual to the facility as an inpatient); see also Medicare 
Program; Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA): Applicability to Hospital Inpatients and 
Hospitals With Specialized Capabilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 5213, 5214 (proposed Feb. 2, 2012).  
31 Medicare Program; Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA): Applicability to Hospital 
Inpatients and Hospitals With Specialized Capabilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 5213 (proposed Feb. 2, 2012).  
32 Id. at 5214. 
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requirements imposed on them by EMTALA.  The policy implications of these “justifications” 
would have a potentially catastrophic effect on future litigation as well as reducing the penalties 
statutorily imposed by the Act.  EMTALA carries a penalty up to $50,000 per violation.33  
CMS’s interpretation reduces the monies received by EMTALA-violating hospitals, for they 
essentially create avenues that allow a hospital to avoid EMTALA requirements simply due to 
the existence of options that could potentially help a victim collect funds for harms the patient 
endures. Instead, these penalties are payments to the government for the wrongs committed on 
society by the hospital and the provider.  This loophole, created by CMS, justifies those wrongs.  
Moreover, in justifying the statutory non-compliance of EMTALA, this action hurts the victims’ 
ability to recover any damages through the other avenues that CMS proposed. This will be 
further explained in Section IV, which discusses the judicial responses to EMTALA violations. 
The action proposed by CMS is akin to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau allowing 
banks to violate federal fraud laws because each individual harmed would have other avenues of 
recourse. 
Further exacerbating the situation, CMS explained in its 2003 Rule, “[If] the hospital 
provides an appropriate medical screening examination and determines that an EMC [emergency 
medical condition] exists, and then admits the individual in good faith in order to stabilize the 
EMC, that hospital has satisfied its EMTALA obligation towards that patient.”34  However, prior 
to instituting the 2003 Rule, CMS expressed the exact concerns that are being addressed now, 
namely that allowing admissions to end the EMTALA inquiry, “would provide an obvious 
means of circumventing [EMTALA] requirements that would seemingly contradict the point of 
                                                 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
34 Medicare Program; Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA): Applicability to Hospital 
Inpatients and Hospitals With Specialized Capabilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 5213, 5217 (proposed Feb. 2, 2012).  
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the statute to protect emergency patient health and safety.”35  CMS went on to reject the Sixth 
Circuit’s conclusion that admission of a patient did not satisfy the stabilization requirement 
enumerated by the statute even though the admission and subsequent discharge led to the death 
of the patient’s wife.36  This explanation has led to a majority of the problems with psychiatric 
patients.  The stabilization prong is satisfied when psychiatric patients are admitted, but when 
patients are discharged before they are truly stabilized, both patients and third-parties may be 
harmed.  As will be discussed further in the next section, the framers of EMTALA did not wish 
to create a law that would allow for hospitals to find loopholes for treating patients. 
III. Statutory Interpretation 
Congress passed EMTALA as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(COBRA) of 1985 in an effort to curb the increased reports of patient dumping throughout the 
nation.37  In certain cases of patient dumping, patients are typically transferred to another 
hospital, usually public hospitals because they are legally required to treat all patients, without 
first being properly stabilized.38  The House Committee on Ways and Means (HCWM) clearly 
stated the purpose and intent behind EMTALA: “The Committee is most concerned that 
medically unstable patients are not being treated appropriately.  There have been reports of 
situations where treatment was simply not provided.  In numerous other instances, patients in an 
unstable condition have been transferred improperly, sometimes without the consent of the 
receiving hospital.”39 
                                                 
35 Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 
67 Fed. Reg. 31404, 31475 (proposed May 9, 2002). 
36 Id.; see also Moses v. Providence Hosp. and Med. Ctrs., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 582-4 (6th Cir. 2009). 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e); 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (2018). (I think this may be miscited).  
38 Id. (Same issue as citation 37) 
39 H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27 (1985). 
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With the creation and passage of EMTALA, Congress wanted “to provide a strong assurance 
that pressures for greater hospital efficiency [were] not to be construed as license to ignore 
traditional community responsibilities and loosen historic standards.”40  The traditional 
responsibilities referenced were the hospital’s historic role of caring for underserved 
communities.41  The problems that faced EDs thirty years ago, at the time EMTALA was 
enacted, are the same problems the nation faces today, with ever-growing healthcare costs.  As 
the HCWM said, “[i]n recent years there has been a growing concern about the provision of 
adequate emergency room services to individuals who seek care, particularly as to the indigent 
and uninsured.”42  Representative Stark, one of the sponsors of the Act, presented the issues 
facing EDs and declared the need for the passage of EMTALA “to prevent this kind of dumping 
of indigent patients.”43  Violations to EMTALA amount to fraud and abuse of the healthcare 
system. 
The language of the statute states that EMTALA applies to EDs within Medicare-
participating hospitals.44  EMTALA duties begin when anyone “comes to the [ED] and a request 
is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition.”45  There 
is no requirement that the individual appearing in the ED be a participant of either Medicare or 
Medicaid, though the statute is specific to Medicare-participating hospitals.46 
After an individual requests treatment, “the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical 
screening examination” in an effort to determine the presence of an “emergency medical 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 See Welzien, supra note 1, at 21-2. 
42 H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 1, at 5 (1985). 
43 131 CONG. REC. E55, 221 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985) (statement of Rep. Stark). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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condition [EMC].”47  This section of EMTALA is the root of most EMTALA interpretation 
issues because while EMTALA defines an “emergency medical condition,” it fails to outline 
what an “appropriate medical screening” would consist of, instead relying on the opinions of 
medical personnel to determine what is “appropriate” for each specific case.48  CMS made 
clarifications in 2010 for psychiatric emergency medical conditions stating, “in the case of 
psychiatric emergencies, if an individual expressing suicidal or homicidal thoughts or gestures, is 
determined dangerous to self or others, [the patient] would be considered to have an EMC,” but 
failed to provide any clarification as to an “appropriate” screening aside from it being conducted 
“to the best abilities of the hospital.”49  If an EMC is discovered through the medical screening, 
the hospital is required to “stabilize the medical condition” or provide an appropriate transfer to a 
better-situated medical facility after the individual has been stabilized.50  In 2010, CMS clarified 
that “[p]sychiatric patients are considered stable when they are protected and prevented from 
injuring or harming him/herself or others.”51 
The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended to prevent patient dumping, and 
specifically feared that certain individuals were not having their conditions treated appropriately 
in emergency settings.52  However, the language of EMTALA itself has served to limit the 
government’s ability to enforce any violations and has served to create poor precedent in 
EMTALA-related litigation.  Specifically, §1395dd(h) of EMTALA prohibits any delays in 
either the screening or stabilization of an individual “in order to inquire about the individual's 
                                                 
47 Id.   
48 Id.; see also § 1395dd(e)(1); see generally § 1395dd(e). 
49 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare State Operations Manual, Appendix V Interpretive 
Guidelines – Responsibilities of Medicare Participating Hospitals in Emergency Cases, Revision 60, July 16, 2010. 
50 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1). 
51 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare State Operations Manual, Appendix V Interpretive 
Guidelines – Responsibilities of Medicare Participating Hospitals in Emergency Cases, Revision 60, July 16, 2010. 
52 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, supra note 39.  
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method of payment or insurance status.”53  This language has led to some jurisdictions requiring 
specific evidence of an individual’s denial of service for economic reasons in order to make a 
valid EMTALA claim, thus rendering any other reasons for denial or delay acceptable.54  The 
division of the courts’ decisions has created unpredictable outcomes in EMTALA cases, 
disadvantaging some of the most vulnerable that EMTALA was envisioned to protect: 
psychiatric patients. 
IV. EMTALA Judicial Interpretation and Settlements 
A. General Judicial Interpretation 
The initial years of EMTALA litigation created improper precedents that severely limited the 
finding of hospital violations.  In one of the earliest cases, the parents of a deceased infant 
attempted to make an EMTALA claim.55  The parents brought the infant into the ED exhibiting 
flu-like symptoms, and the physician tested the child believing there was no serious condition 
present.  Both parents were told to go to another hospital to meet with a pediatrician, but no 
ambulance was provided for their transport.56  The infant’s condition worsened and 
approximately one hour after arriving at the second hospital, the child died.57  The court found 
the parents’ claim invalid because they failed to “allege that their financial condition or lack of 
health insurance contributed to Dr. Estabrook's decision not to treat their son.”58  In announcing 
its reasoning, the court required a showing of economic concerns to have standing under 
EMTALA, ignoring the actual language of the Act, which requires the patient to be screened and 
                                                 
53 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). 
54 See Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F. Supp. 325, 330 (D.N.H. 1989). 
55 Id. at 329.  
56 Id. at 326. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 330. 
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stabilized prior to transfer or discharge.59  However, the court in Nichols completely overlooked 
the civil enforcement section of EMTALA which reads: 
Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's 
violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against the participating 
hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State in 
which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate.60 
 
Since Nichols was one of the first EMTALA decisions, courts began adopting its improper 
analysis, creating a precedent of legitimizing EMTALA violations.61 
The Sixth Circuit did not fail, as other circuits have, to interpret the language correctly, and it 
should be used as a guide for all EMTALA cases in the future.  The Sixth Circuit follows the 
language and statutory intent of EMTALA better than any other circuit, as will be demonstrated 
in the remainder of this article.  Aside from the fact that the Sixth Circuit was one of the first 
federal courts to discuss whether EMTALA mandates appropriate medical care procedures once 
a patient is admitted to the hospital for inpatient care, the Sixth Circuit is the only Circuit to have 
rejected CMS’s proposed regulation on the grounds that it was contrary to the legislative intent 
of EMTALA.  In Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, the plaintiff claimed that both the 
hospital and the physician failed to stabilize her before discharge, in violation of the stabilization 
requirement of EMTALA.62  After the patient arrived at the ED, the patient was admitted to the 
hospital's intensive care unit for ten days after she suffered a stroke.63  Following the initial ten 
days in intensive care, the patient spent an additional eleven days in general inpatient care for the 
continued treatment of her condition.64  The physician discharged the patient to home care, 
                                                 
59 Id.; 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(a). 
60 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). 
61 See Evitt v. University Heights Hospital, 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).   
62 895 F.2d 1131, 1132 (6th Cir. 1990). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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where her condition worsened after the rehabilitation facility refused to accept her.65  As the 
court explained in its conclusion that the stabilization of a patient extends beyond merely 
admitting them as an inpatient, it stated: 
The Hospital argues that the repeated use of the phrase, “emergency room,” in these 
statements indicates that Congress intended that the requirement to care for a patient not 
extend to where the patient was admitted to the hospital.  A fairer reading is that Congress 
sought to insure that patients with medical emergencies would receive emergency care.  
Although emergency care often occurs, and almost invariably begins, in an emergency room, 
emergency care does not always stop when a patient is wheeled from the emergency room 
into the main hospital.  Hospitals may not circumvent the requirements of EMTALA merely 
by admitting an emergency room patient to the hospital, then immediately discharging that 
patient.  Emergency care must be given until the patient's emergency medical condition is 
stabilized.66 
 
The court’s reasoning shows that it considered both the statutory language and the 
congressional intent in making its decision.  The Sixth Circuit properly identified that the 
stabilization requirement of EMTALA cannot logically end when a patient is admitted into 
another area of the hospital.  It also correctly identified that hospitals may use the admissions as 
an avenue to “circumvent the requirements of the Act.”  While this case did not specifically 
address an EMTALA violation with a psychiatric patient, the framework and reasoning set forth 
by the Thornton court would be applied in the later, seminal, Sixth Circuit psychiatric case of 
Moses v. Providence Hosp. and Medical Centers, Inc. 
B. Psychiatric Cases 
Patient stabilization is essential to EMTALA cases involving psychiatric patients.  Whether 
patient admittance allows a hospital to avoid abiding by the stabilization requirement is 
particularly at issue in EMTALA psychiatric cases.67  The plain language of the statute, along 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1135. 
67 See Hollinger v. Reading Health Sys., No. CV 15-5249, 2016 WL 3762987 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2016). 
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with the legislative history, requires that once a hospital identifies that an EMC exists, it must 
stabilize the patient prior to discharge or transfer.68 
In the wrongly decided Hollinger case, a patient brought to the ED by ambulance exhibited 
signs of delirium and suffered from seizures.69  Medical personnel admitted the patient for 
further treatment and testing, but the patient continued to exhibit signs of delirium in addition to 
being violent toward staff members, striking at least one.70  A doctor that had not treated the 
patient reviewed the notes of the treating physician and determined that the patient’s delirium 
had been resolved and was discharged, but the patient was, “at high risk of violent behavior and 
1:1 observation [was] recommended for safety.”71  Immediately following discharge, the patient 
was arrested by the local police and taken to jail for striking the medical personnel.72  In 
dismissing the plaintiff’s claim of an EMTALA violation for failure to stabilize the patient prior 
to discharge, the court reasoned that admission to the hospital ended the EMTALA inquiry.73  
However, the court failed to look at the plain language of the statute and failed to consider the 
stabilization definition provided by CMS.  Nothing in the statute states that admitting a patient 
negates the requirement of stabilization, nor does the evidence in the case show that the patient 
was stable before discharge.74  The doctor stated that the patient was still “at high risk of violent 
behavior,”75 and therefore was not “protected and prevented from injuring or harming 
him/herself or others.”76  This case stands as an example of how the statutory construction and 
                                                 
68 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(a). 
69 Hollinger, 2016 WL 3762987, at *1. 
70 Id. at *2. 
71 Id. at *3. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at *9. 
74 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(a). 
75 Hollinger, 2016 WL 3762987, at *3. 
76 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare State Operations Manual, Appendix V Interpretive 
Guidelines – Responsibilities of Medicare Participating Hospitals in Emergency Cases, Revision 60, July 16, 2010. 
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legislative history have been completely overlooked when deciding EMTALA cases involving 
psychiatric patients. 
In contrast to Hollinger and in furtherance of the correct application of the EMTALA 
statutory language, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Moses v. Providence Hosp. and Medical 
Centers, Inc. involved a psychiatric EMTALA case decided in accordance with the statutory 
language as well as the legislative intent, making it better precedent for all psychiatric EMTALA 
cases going forward.77  In Moses, the patient was brought to the emergency room of Providence 
Hospital after he exhibited signs of physical and mental illness, specifically hallucinations and 
delusions.78  Doctors determined that the patient should be admitted for further testing to 
determine the best treatment for his “atypical psychosis.”79  The patient was tested for one day 
and then discharged, despite a report stating that he still had “atypical psychosis” as well as his 
wife’s fear that he was still a danger to her or himself.80  Ten days after the patient was released, 
he murdered his wife.  This suit resulted when he sued the hospital for discharging him prior to 
stabilization, in violation of EMTALA.  The lower court dismissed the case, claiming that 
admitting the patient exempted the hospital from further EMTALA compliance.81 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal after looking at the statutory language, 
reasoning that “a hospital may not release a patient with an emergency medical condition without 
first determining that the patient has actually stabilized, even if the hospital properly admitted the 
patient.”82  After conducting a plain language interpretation, the court added that hospitals under 
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EMTALA were required “not just to admit the patient into the inpatient care unit, but to treat him 
in order to stabilize him” before a discharge or transfer.83 
The court in Moses went beyond simply rejecting the CMS regulations.  It instead dissected 
the CMS rule and attacked the rule’s validity based on a plain language interpretation of the 
EMTALA statute.84  While the Sixth Circuit did not provide a definition of what a “bad faith” 
admission is, it provided a clear basis for rejecting the interpretation of the rule proposed by 
CMS.85  The Moses court reasoned that “[t]he CMS rule appears contrary to EMTALA's plain 
language, which requires a hospital to ‘provide . . . for such further medical examination and 
such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition.”’86  The reasoning 
proposed by the Sixth Circuit focused on the term “treatment” in the statute.87  As discussed in 
Section II of this article, the Sixth Circuit properly focused its analysis on the plain language 
interpretation of the statute, which was further reinforced in its analysis of the legislative intent.88 
The court focused on the fact that the statute demands that a patient be stabilized prior to 
discharge or transfer.89 
The Sixth Circuit’s rejection of an administrative rule was unfounded.  According to the rule 
established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a court may 
reject a rule created by an administrative agency if the rule runs contrary to the legislative intent 
or statutory construction.90  The Moses court refused to accept the CMS regulation because it 
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viewed CMS’s interpretation to be “contrary to the plain language of the statute.”91  The Sixth 
Circuit has been the sole circuit to reject the CMS admission regulation.  This rejection is proper 
under the Chevron standard established by the Supreme Court in 1984.  While the Supreme 
Court has not yet had the opportunity to hear an EMTALA case involving a psychiatric patient, 
the reasoning applied by the Sixth Circuit is most closely aligned with the plain language 
interpretation as well as the legislative history of EMTALA.  Additionally, the most recent 
settlements of psychiatric cases involve almost identical facts, further bolstering the applicability 
of the Sixth Circuit’s model for analyzing these cases.92 
C. Recent Settlements 
In the past two years, the government has settled four cases in which there was an EMTALA 
violation involving a psychiatric patient.  The largest settlement occurred in June 2017, involving 
AnMed Health in South Carolina.  In that particular settlement, the government found thirty-six 
incidents of EMTALA violations involving psychiatric patients.93  One particular case involved a 
patient being kept in the ED for thirty-eight days without treatment or stabilization.94  The result 
of these thirty-six violations led to a $1,295,000 settlement agreement.95  The Research Medical 
Center in Kansas City settled for $360,000 for seventeen violations involving the failure to 
provide an adequate medical screening examination and improper transfer of a patient in 
November 2016.96  The reported incident that led to the settlement involved a psychiatric patient 
being transferred to another facility without stabilization, causing the individual to leave the 
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vehicle and be struck by another car on the road.97  In May 2016, Grady Memorial Hospital in 
Atlanta settled for $40,000 after failing to provide an adequate medical screening examination 
and failing to provide stabilizing treatment to a psychiatric patient.98  Grady counselors 
determined that the patient required further testing and stabilization; however, the on-call 
physician discharged the patient without consulting the counselors and without stabilization.99  
The facts of the last settlement are strikingly similar to those of Hollinger, reinforcing the need 
to depart from the line of reasoning that decision has perpetuated.  In January 2016, Floyd 
Medical Center in Georgia entered into a $50,000 settlement agreement for failure to evaluate 
and treat a mentally ill patient who was transferred from another hospital.100  The patient was 
aggressive, but instead of providing treatment to stabilize the individual, hospital security 
detained him and transferred the patient to police custody without any form of treatment, aside 
from the emergency physician stating the individual was medically cleared.101 
The fact that there has been a growing number of settlements in recent years reinforces the 
need for judicial intervention on this topic.  Settlements for EMTALA cases do not arise until the 
government has been alerted by a private party about an EMTALA violation.102  Additionally, 
when the courts determine that an EMTALA violation did not occur, that determination makes it 
harder for CMS to make a settlement with the offending hospital or physician.103  The effect this 
has on EMTALA recovery is disastrous for both the government and the harmed party.  When a 
court finds no EMTALA violation, the victim is harmed without a remedy and the government is 
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harmed because it is precluded from entering a settlement.  The adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning for EMTALA cases will insure that other courts quickly and effectively resolve future 
cases involving psychiatric patients.  This adoption would also strengthen the effect of EMTALA 
and force CMS to reconsider its flawed interpretation of the Act. 
V. Conclusion 
In addition to the recent settlements, reports have shown that psychiatric patients, in general, 
face extended stays in waiting rooms, highlighting the potential for EMTALA fraud and 
abuse.104  Approximately 23% of those patients remain in an ED for more than six hours and just 
over 1% stay longer than twenty-four hours.105  In contrast to psychiatric patients, only around 
10% of medical patients remain for more than six hours and 0.5% remain in EDs for more than 
twenty-four hours.106  This troubling report, along with the growing number of settlements, 
emphasizes the need for stronger enforcement of EMTALA with an interpretation consistent 
with the legislative intent to protect the most vulnerable populations.  By adopting the rationale 
used by the Sixth Circuit in Moses for all EMTALA cases involving psychiatric patients, courts 
will be able to apply a clear framework with consistent results.  Not every violation is as clear as 
situations like the settlement in South Carolina, but the violations still negatively affect those 
psychiatric patients.  The courts must return to the congressional intent of the Act to best protect 
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these vulnerable individuals because the “[concern] that medically unstable patients are not being 
treated appropriately”107 continues to be realized to the detriment of psychiatric patients.108 
The best solution for reviving the congressional intent of EMTALA is through the courts, 
specifically, the use of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning and application for EMTALA cases.  As 
discussed above, the precedent established, allows courts to reject administrative regulations 
contrary to legislative intent.109  “Ordinarily, the construction and interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law for the courts where the administrative decision is not entitled to special 
deference, particularly where, as here, the statute has not previously been subjected to judicial 
scrutiny or time-tested agency interpretations.”110  CMS created a rule contrary to legislative 
intent, which allows hospitals to escape EMTALA liability so long as they “admit the patient in 
good faith.”111  If more courts continue to reject CMS’s guidance, the Supreme Court will 
eventually be forced to address a growing circuit split, and provide stronger guidance about 
EMTALA.  The Sixth Circuit remains the only circuit to reject CMS’s rule, and correctly 
interpreted EMTALA the way the enacting Congress intended.  It is time for EMTALA to once 
again protect the most vulnerable patients from mistreatment. 
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